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The Crucial Flaw in the Bank System. 
Ralph S. Musgrave. 
 
Abstract. 
One of the main activities of banks is accepting deposits, lending on most of 
the money concerned, while telling depositors their money is safe, which it 
quite clearly is not, because loaned on money is never totally safe. That is 
fraud: indeed when any other financial institution does that (e.g. a mutual fund 
or private pension scheme), that activity is classed as fraud. 
The latter problem can be dealt with via taxpayer backed deposit insurance 
and billion dollar bail-outs for banks in trouble, but that puts banks in a 
privileged position relative to other financial institutions, and indeed non-
financial institutions and corporations. I.e. taxpayer backed deposit insurance 
and bailouts amount to a subsidy for banks. Plus taxpayer backing for 
depositors who want their money loaned out with a view to earning interest 
flouts a widely accepted principle, namely that it is not normally the job of 
governments / taxpayers to stand behind commercial activities, and having a 
bank lend on your money is certainly a commercial activity. 
The solution is full reserve banking (also known as Sovereign Money), which 
consists of abandoning deposit insurance and bailouts, and giving depositor / 
investors the choice between, first, a totally safe method of storing money, 
which consists simply of having money lodged with government or the central 
bank, with that money earning little or no interest, and second, an account 
where money is loaned out, with the result that a higher rate of interest is 
earned, but depositor / investors carry the risks. 
____________ 
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There is a simple flaw in the existing “fractional reserve” bank system which 
I’ve set out before (Musgrave (2014 & 2018a) and to which opponents of the 
existing bank system do not seem to pay much attention. The explanation of 
this flaw below is more detailed than the 2014 version (about 3,000 words 
rather than about 400), and this present version deals with the objections to 
the above “fraud accusation” made by George Selgin. Plus there are 
references to literature on the subject published since 2018. The flaw is as 
follows. 
Banks have for centuries accepted deposits and loaned on most of the money 
concerned, while promising depositors or at least suggesting to depositors 
their money is safe. That promise is plain fraudulent and for the simple reason 
that loaned on money is never safe: the fact is that throughout history, most 
banks at some point get into trouble as a result of making silly loans and that 
“trouble”, time and again, leads to banks collapsing altogether. (For a brief 
history of banking going back about four thousand years, see Fuller (2019). 
And in case there is any doubt that the latter basic activity of banks is 
fraudulent, note that when any other financial institution tells depositor / 
investors their money is safe, such institutions are prosecuted for fraud. By 
“other financial institutions” I mean private pension schemes, mutual funds 
(known as “unit trusts” in the UK) and so on. 
Defenders of the existing bank system do not of course take the above fraud 
accusation lying down. Perhaps the most authoritative critic of the fraud 
accusation is George Selgin. However his arguments do not stand inspection, 
as is shown under the heading “George Selgin” below. 
Incidentally some readers may object to the above suggestion that banks lend 
on depositors’ money and may wish to claim banks create the money they 
lend out of thin air. In fact as an article published by the Bank of England says 
(McLeay (2014) “banks do not act simply as intermediaries.” In other words, 
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banks do act as intermediaries between lenders and borrowers as suggested 
above, but it’s not that simple. As the article explains, banks do at the same 
time create a certain amount of money from thin air every year. 
Another incidental point is that having said above that critics of the existing 
bank system have overlooked the flaw set out here, it is true that numerous 
people have pointed to the fraudulent element in fractional reserve banking. 
Plus clearly numerous people have objected to bank bailouts. However, not 
enough attention has been devoted to the basic point made here, which is 
along the lines of “the system is fraudulent, but if that problem is dealt with via 
deposit insurance and bailouts, that is no solution because it equals a subsidy 
of banks.” 
Having said banks get preferential treatment relative to other financial 
institutions, they actually get preferential treatment relative to non-financial 
institutions and corporations as well. Reason is that the latter corporations 
actually create money in a way not entirely different to the way in which banks 
do. That is, most countries count money in term accounts at banks where the 
term is around two months or less as money, which in turn means that anyone 
holding bonds in a non-bank corporation where the bond has about two 
months or less to run till maturity ought for the sake of consistency to be 
counted as the holder of money as well. 
But banks, to repeat enjoy taxpayer backed deposit insurance and billion 
dollar bail outs, whereas non-bank corporations normally do not. 
But perhaps there are good reasons for banks’ privileged status. 
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The excuses for banks’ privileged status. 
One excuse for letting banks claim deposits are safe is that that claim equals 
claiming banks’ liabilities (i.e. deposits) are fixed in value (inflation apart) 
which turns those liabilities into a form of money, which in turn increases the 
money supply, which is stimulatory. Well the simple answer to that is that 
central banks can create infinite amounts of money any time for stimulus 
purposes and at zero real cost by simply pressing buttons on computer 
keyboards. Moreover, central banks can do that without fraud in any shape or 
form being involved and without creating any sort of privileged status for 
commercial banks. (Incidentally, the above point that deposits are fixed in 
value, inflation apart, might seem a contradiction in terms, since inflation 
clearly erodes the value of money. However, the point here is that deposits 
are fixed in value relative to for example shares, used cars, houses etc which 
are quite clearly not fixed in value: witness the dramatic fall in shares as a 
result of the Corona virus crisis.) 
Having criticised commercial banks for enjoying privileged status, it should of 
course be admitted that central banks also enjoy privileged status of a sort, 
but then any country absolutely has to decide what its basic form of money will 
be and has to have some sort of institution to issue that money. If it’s not a 
central bank, then the Treasury can issue money (as was the case in the UK 
in WWI). To object to the privileged status of central banks is like objecting to 
a privilege enjoyed by the army or the police, that is the right to use firearms. 
And not only can central banks create whatever amount of money is needed 
to compensate for withdrawing commercial banks’ right to create money, but 
commercial banks are so hopeless that issuing the right amount of money at 
the right time that central banks have had to issue astronomic amounts of 
money first in reaction to the bank crisis that erupted in 2007/8 and second in 
reaction to the Corvid crisis. Thus any idea that we can do without some sort 
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of central money issuing authority, central bank or other authority, is plain 
unrealistic. 
 
Should taxpayers back commercial ventures? 
Another illogical aspect to the existing system is that it flouts a widely 
accepted principle, namely that it is not normally the job of taxpayers to rescue 
commercial ventures which go wrong. And having a bank (or mutual fund, 
pension scheme, or stockbroker) lend on or invest depositor / investors’ 
money is definitely a commercial activity. 
 
Deposit insurance. 
To summarise, the central flaw in fractional reserve banking is that the basic 
activity of such banks, namely accepting deposits, lending on depositors’ 
money while telling depositors their money is safe is fraudulent. But if that 
problem is dealt with via deposit insurance and bail-outs for banks in trouble, 
that means banks get privileged status relative to other institutions, financial 
and non-financial. 
In contrast to the latter nonsense, it would be perfectly possible to have a 
system where that nonsense is disposed of. To do that, deposit insurance and 
bailouts need to be abandoned, and anyone who wants a totally safe account 
needs to be allowed to lodge their money with government or the central bank. 
Little or no interest would be earned on that money. Indeed, that facility is to 
all intents and purposes already available in countries which have state run 
savings banks (e.g. “National Savings and Investments” in the UK). 
As for those who want to have their money loaned on or invested, there is 
absolutely nothing wrong with that, as long as it is made abundantly clear to 
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them that they may lose as well as make money and that there is no taxpayer 
funded bailout for them when things go wrong. 
It would even be legitimate for a mutual fund or similar to invest or lend on 
most of depositor / investor’s money while promising depositor / investors they 
can turn a portion of their investment into cash any time and have the fund 
transfer that money to someone of the depositor / investor’s choosing. That 
arrangement would not involve the flaw explained above as long as investors 
are made fully aware that they may never get as much money back from the 
fund as they originally put in. After all, any individual is free to engage in the 
latter activity off their own bat at the moment: that is, anyone is free to buy 
stock exchange quoted shares, and then sell a few of them when they need to 
pay someone some cash. 
And the above “safe account and risky investment account” arrangement is of 
course the one, or at least is very close to the one that has been advocated by 
numerous leading economists and organisations for a long time, e.g. Positive 
Money, Wolf (2014), Tobin (1987), Kotlikoff (2010), Joseph Huber (2000) and 
Fisher (1936). 
 
George Selgin. 
Probably the most authoritative and active critic of the above “fraud charge” 
over the last twenty years or so is George Selgin. One of his criticisms is that 
fraud does not take place unless someone actually loses money. 
To be exact, on p.86 of Selgin and White (1995), the authors invoke a 
definition of fraud which does not stand inspection. The definition is “failure to 
fulfil a voluntarily agreed upon transfer of property”. (Incidentally and for those 
tempted to claim the latter work of Selgin and White is now a bit dated, those 
two authors have constantly repeated the points made in their 1996 work 
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since that time: i.e. that 1996 work is dealt with here because it is one of their 
earliest expositions of their ideas. And moving on around twenty years, 
Selgin’s defence of fractional reserve is very much on-going: for example one 
of his more recent articles on this subject was last year: Selgin (2019)) 
Anyway, the answer to Selgin and White’s “transfer of property” point is that 
there is such a thing in law as a fraudulent offer, which itself is fraud, even if 
there is no failure to “transfer property”. 
To illustrate, if I take money from you and offer to put it on a horse and 
guarantee that you won’t lose money, that is a fraudulent offer, because, as 
everyone knows, any horse can fall at the first fence. Whether the horse wins 
or not is irrelevant: it does not alter the fact that a fraudulent offer has been 
made. 
Then in the next paragraph, the authors argue that banks only act fraudulently 
if they claim to operate 100 percent reserve accounts when in fact they 
operate fractional reserve accounts. As they put it, “…it is fraudulent for a 
bank to hold fractional reserves if and only if the bank misrepresents itself as 
holding 100 percent reserves, or if the contract expressly calls for the holding 
of 100 percent reserves.’ If a bank does not represent or expressly oblige itself 
to hold 100 percent reserves, then fractional reserves do not violate the 
contractual agreement between the bank and its customer…”. (The authors 
make much the same point near the bottom of their p.88). 
Well the simple answer to that is that about 90% of depositors don’t have any 
idea what the phrases “100 percent reserve” or “fractional reserve” mean! 
Thus the authors’ “100 percent / fractional reserve” point is plain irrelevant. 
The reality is that most depositors have always been persuaded by banks that 
depositors’ money is safe, and the second undeniable reality is that that 
money just isn’t totally safe: witness the fact that taxpayers had to come to the 
rescue of sundry banks during the bank crisis that started in 2007/8! 
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Moreover, why did governments ever introduce deposit insurance (in the early 
1930s in the US and somewhat later in the UK)? The reason is very simple 
and common sense, namely that it was generally regarded as unacceptable 
that ordinary households and small businesses should lose some or all of their 
stock of money! In other words when bank failures came thick and fast in the 
1920s and 30s particularly in the US, the general view was that the scandal 
consisted of the fact that ordinary depositors thought their deposits were safe: 
they certainly did not regard their deposits (as Selgin and White suggest) in 
the same light as stock market quoted shares, where the general public fully 
accepted that come a stock market crash, shareholders could lose big time 
and would react with a cavalier “you win some you lose some” attitude. Thus, 
and contrary to Selgin and White’s suggestions, it was obviously very unclear 
in those days exactly how safe bank deposits were supposed to be. 
Incidentally Caplan (2011) also makes the above “depositors should be aware 
that deposits are not safe” claim. 
 
Free markets. 
Next, in the para starting “But whether the informed…” (p.88), Selgin and 
White argue that a ban on fractional reserve would amount to an unjustified 
interference with the right of banks and depositors to come to mutually 
acceptable agreements. Nair (2013) and Rozeff (2010) express similar 
sentiments. 
 
That’s a good point, but that point is catered for via the risky accounts that are 
inherent to full reserve banking (mentioned above). 
About the only remaining question is the one raised by but not answered by 
Selgin and White in relation to risky accounts. That is (to quote S&W), “…the 
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question of whether a warning sticker really is needed to avoid misleading 
customers . . . . . and, if so, to the question of how explicit the sticker must be.” 
Well I suggest that if banks offering risky accounts had to publish the sort of 
“health warning” or “sticker” that mutual funds etc are required to publish and 
with equal frequency, then banks would be competing on a level playing field 
with respect to those other financial institutions. 
Moreover, those of a Selgin persuasion cannot possibly object to banks 
making it totally clear that deposited money is not safe in the case of risky 
accounts because those of a Selgin persuasion claim that depositors are 
already aware their money can go up in smoke. 
Of course there is a slight clash between the latter “go up in smoke” money 
and the claim earlier in this paper to the effect that money by definition is 
something the value of which is fixed, inflation apart. The answer to that clash 
is that while money is normally regarded as something which is fixed in value, 
there is no good reason to stop anyone trying to use something else as 
money, unless obvious harm results from that attempt: if someone wants to try 
using bottles of whiskey as money, it is not obvious why that attempt should 
be made illegal. 
And finally, George Selgin is of course far from being the only person to 
criticise full reserve banking. However this is not the place to deal with all 
those other criticisms: I dealt with about forty such criticisms in section 2 of 
Musgrave (2018b). 
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Endnote. 
If you wish to comment on the above article, you can do so after the version of 
the article which appears at the Medium site here: 
https://medium.com/@ralph_47183/the-crucial-flaw-in-the-bank-system-
2b1d36b194de 
That “Medium” version is identical to the above version.  
______________ 
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